The 'Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation' was the Soviet defence of the Kursk salient and otherwise known as the Battle of Kursk, in which the main hostilities took place on the north-eastern and south-eastern faces of the Kursk salient and which was carried out with the object of defeating the German 'Zitadelle' offensive intended to pinch out the salient (5/16 July 1943).

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After the conclusion of the battle for the Donets river and as the spring rasputitsa (mud) season came to an end in the spring of 1943, the Germans and the Soviets each took stock of their plans for future operations. On the Soviet side, Iosef Stalin and some senior officers wanted to seize the initiative first and attack the German forces on the Eastern Front, but were soon convinced by a number of key commanders, including the deputy supreme commander, Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza Georgi K. Zhukov, that it would be better to assume a defensive posture as this would allow the Germans to weaken themselves in attacking prepared positions, after which the Soviet forces would be able to respond more effectively with a counter-offensive.

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Strategic discussions also occurred on the German side, with Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein arguing for a mobile defence that would yield territory and allow the Soviets to advance, while the German forces launched a series of sharp counterattacks against their flanks to inflict heavy attritional losses. But for political reasons, Adolf Hitler insisted that the Germans take the offensive, and the Kursk salient was selected as the area for the attack. On 15 April, Hitler ordered the start of preparations for 'Zitadelle'.

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'Zitadelle' called for a double envelopment, directed at Kursk, to surround the five Soviet armies defending the area and seal off the salient. Generalfeldmarschall Günther Hans von Kluge’s Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' was to provide Generaloberst Walter Model’s 9^th Army as the northern pincer, which was to strike through the north-eastern end of the salient, drive to the south and south-east to the hills lying to the east of Kursk and secure the railway lining Orel and Kursk from Soviet attack. Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe 'Süd' was to commit Generaloberst Hermann Hoth’s 4^th Panzerarmee and General Werner Kempf’s Armeeabteilung 'Kempf' to pierce the south-eastern corner of the salient. These two formations were then to drive north and north-east to meet the 9^th Army in the area to the east of Kursk. von Manstein’s main attack was to be delivered by the 4^th Panzerarmee, spearheaded by SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS Paul Hausser’s II SS Panzerkorps. General Otto von Knobelsdorff’s XLVIII Panzerkorps and the Armeeabteilung 'Kempf' were to advance on the left and right respectively. General Walter Weiss’s 2^nd Army was to contain the western portion of the salient.

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The German object in 'Zitadelle' was thus to pinch out the large Soviet westward-facing salient centred on Kursk, for this would shorten the German front, so allowing the diversion of troops to other sectors of the Eastern Front, and to take Kursk, which was the birthplace of the T-34 tank and an extremely important development and manufacturing component of the USSR’s war industries.

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'Zitadelle' was originally to have been launched at the beginning of May, but was postponed several times as the German leadership reconsidered and vacillated over its prospects, and also used the time to bring forward more formations and units as well as more, and in some cases, more modern weapons and equipment.

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As soon as the German high command had issued the order for 'Zitadelle', which ordained that the operation should be ready to start at six days' notice after 28 April, the 9^th Army, which was to head the offensive in the zone of Heeresgruppe 'Mitte', protested that its deployment could not be completed by 3 May. At a meeting on 3 May, Hitler conferred with von Manstein, von Kluge, Model, General Kurt Zeitzler in his capacity as chief of the army general staff, Generaloberst Heinz Guderian in his capacity as inspector general of armoured troops, Albert Speer in his capacity as minister of armaments and munitions, and Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek in his capacity as the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe’s chief-of-staff. There followed a discussion on the problems which Model expected the 9^th Army might encounter in breaking through a 'well-fortified' Soviet front line and the inability of the PzKpfw IV battle tank to stand up to the newest Soviet anti-tank weapons. Hitler closed the meeting without giving any decision, but indicated privately to Model that 'Zitadelle' was be postponed. von Manstein, von Kluge, Zeitzler and Jeschonnek all objected to the idea of any delay, and Guderian and Speer objected to 'Zitadelle' being executed at all because they argued that even if successful the offensive would entail heavy tank losses and upset plans for an overall increase in armoured strength for the army. Hitler decided to let 'Zitadelle' wait until June, by which time he expected to have tanks of newer models available in quantity. On 6 May, the Oberkommando des Heeres announced the postponement of 'Zitadelle' to 12 June.

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On 10 May, Guderian was summoned to Berlin for a discussion on the production of the new PzKpfw V Panther battle tank, and potential delays in its programme. After the conference, Guderian asked for meeting with Hitler, in which Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht’s general staff, Generalleutnant Wolfgang Thomale, Guderian’s chief-of-staff, and Karl Saur, the state secretary of the armaments ministry, were also present. Guderian asked Hitler why he wished to attack on the Eastern Front at all and how many people even knew where Kursk. According to Guderian, Hitler responded that Guderian was quite correct and that when he thought about the attack his stomach turned over. Hitler assured Guderian that there was as yet no inevitable commitment to the operation. However, at a May meeting of Nazi party officials, Hitler compared the current situation in the Eastern Front to the predicament of the party in 1932, when it seemed to go down in political defeat at the hands of Franz von Papen and Hindenburg. He stated that 'In 1932, we attained victory only by stubbornness that sometimes looked like madness; so, too, we will achieve it today.'

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In the first weeks of June, the forces for 'Zitadelle' were at their peak. On 18 June, the operations staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, which was not in fact responsible for operations on the Eastern Front, submitted a proposal that 'Zitadelle' be abandoned, and that all the forces which could be spared should be redeployed into strategic reserve for the defence of Italy and the Balkans, as well as of Germany proper. On the same day, Hitler responded that while he fully appreciated the opinion of the operations staff, he had decided to proceed. Two days later, he scheduled the start of 'Zitadelle' for 5 July.

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The Soviet supreme command had learned from its intelligence agencies and foreign sources about the German plan, and therefore the multiple German delays provided it with considerable time to prepare the defences of the Kursk salient. Sensibly opting for defence in great depth, the Soviets constructed a series of defensive lines to wear down the attacking Panzer formations. Three primary belts, each comprising large minefields, anti-tank ditches and anti-tank gun emplacements, were created. Behind those were an additional three belts, which were mostly unoccupied and less well fortified. Vatutin’s Voronezh Front was tasked with defending the salient’s southern face, and Rokossovsky’s Central Front was ordered to defend its northern face. Waiting in reserve was General Polkovnik Ivan S. Konev’s Steppe Front. It is worth noting that in February 1943, the Central Front had been reconstructed from the Don Front, which had been part of the northern pincer of 'Uran' and had been responsible for the destruction of Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich Paulus’s 6^th Army at Stalingrad.

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The 'Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation' was fought in to geographically separate but operationally and chronologically interlinked sub-operations: on the northern face of the Kursk salient was the 'Orel-Kursk Defensive Operation' (5/11 July), and on the salient’s southern face the 'Belgorod-Kursk Defensive Operation' (5/23 July).

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The Soviet defence of the Kursk salient was the task of two fronts. In the north was Rokossovsky’s Central Front, whose 61^st Army, 3^rd Army, 53^rd Army, 3^rd Guards Tank Army, 48^th Army, 13^th Army, 2^nd Tank Army, 70^th Army, 6^th Army and 60^th Army held the line southward from Belev to Ponyri, then westward to Dmitrovsk Orlovsky, and finally southward to the Seim river at Korenevo. In the south was Vatutin’s Voronezh Front, whose 38^th Army, 40^th Army, 27^th Army, 1^st Tank Army, 6^th Guards Army, 5^th Guards Army, 5^th Guards Tank Army, 53^rd Army, 69^th Army and 7^th Guards Army held the line southward from the Seim river to the Sumy area, then eastward to the Belgorod area and finally southward to Volchansk.

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The German attack on the Central Front was that of von Kluge’s Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' in the form of Model’s 9^th Army, and on the Voronezh Front was that of von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe 'Süd' in the form of Hoth’s 4^th Panzerarmee and Kempf’s Armeeabteilung 'Kempf'.

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It is often claimed that the repeated postponement of the start date for 'Zitadelle' from times in May to June and finally to July 1943 was a major contributor to the German defeat in that year’s summer. For example, Generalfeldmarschall Ewald von Kleist argued after the end of World War II that 'the Germans were four weeks late in launching the Battle of Kursk, [and] that was our opinion before the start of the fighting', and a similar opinion was expressed by von Manstein. These German views reflect the belief of many that in May the Soviet forces in the Kursk region were too weak, in both men and matériel, to have withstood 'Zitadelle'. However, this belief conflicts with details of the Soviet supreme command’s plan for the summer campaign and the Soviet reinforcement, retraining and resupply effort

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Zhukov later noted that 'until 12 April, the headquarters had not yet worked out a specific decision on the methods of action of our troops in the spring and summer period of 1943 in the Kursk Bulge area.' On 12 April, in the course of a meeting between Iosef Stalin, Zhukov (deputy supreme commander), Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza Aleksandr M. Vasilevsky (chief of the general staff) and General Polkovnik Aleksei I. Antonov (first deputy chief of the general staff), drew on the evidence provided by political intelligence (as early as April the British intelligence officer and double agent had warned the USSR that a German offensive was to be made) and the strategic and front-line intelligence services to conclude that the Germans, in the period following the hardening of the ground after the spring thaw early in May, would launch an offensive with the aim of eliminating the westward-facing salient centred on Kursk. The Soviet politico-military leadership therefore reached a preliminary decision to switch to strategic defence.

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At this time, it should be noted, the Germans had only the 'Draft Plan for Operation Zitadelle' of 12 April.

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By the end of the month, the Soviet leadership had decided to implement a major preparation of Rokossovsky’s Central Front and Vatutin’s Voronezh Front in the form initially of increased planning by their military councils in co-operation with the general staff. On 25 and 28 April, the commanders of both fronts reported that the completion of their allotted tasks was essentially concluded. The Soviet supreme command approved the general scheme of the Kursk strategic defensive operation presented by Rokossovsky and Vatutin, and ordered the full preparation by 10 May of the two fronts' forces to repel the German attack that was now known to be in the offing, and also set the date for the Soviet forces' possible transition to the offensive no later than 1 June.

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It was thanks to the implementation of far-sighted decisions of 12 April that by the end of the first days of May the Soviets were basically ready to conduct defensive battles near Kursk with the forces that the Germans currently possessed in the Kursk area, and by the beginning of June the Central Front and Voronezh Front had the numbers of men that would prove decisive in after the launch of 'Zitadelle'.

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On 20 March, Rokossovsky’s Central Front had 304,464 men, but by 5 May this total had increased to 365,641, representing 78% of its manpower strength at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk. At the same time, the number of men in General Leytenant Nikolai P. Pukhov’s 13^th Army, which was the formation of the Central Front that was to take on the main blow of Generaloberst Walter Model’s 9^th Army on the north-eastern shoulder of the salient, during the same time increased by 42,552 men to 114,456 men, which was 86% of its strength on 5 July. The increase was the result primarily of the arrival of three infantry divisions, and the reinforcement of its current divisions by some 18% from averages of 6,378 to 7,527 men. For Pukhov’s army, April was the month in which it received the largest replenishment of manpower in the entire period of preparation for summer battles. By 29 May the 13^th Army had received another 14,701 men for a strength of 129,157 men, representing 97% of the manpower strength on 5 July. By the end of May, the Central Front had 451,179 men, or 97% of the total at the beginning of 'Zitadelle'.

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So far as armoured vehicle strength was concerned, on 3 May the Central Front had 674 tanks and 38 self-propelled guns, or 40% of the availability of such vehicles on 5 July, and the 13^th Army possessed 137 tanks, or 64% of the number it had at the beginning of the battles. At the start of May, the Central Front was significantly inferior to the Voronezh Front: on 15 May, the Voronezh Front had 1,380 tanks, or 76% of the number that it would field by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, and the Central Front only half as many. By the end of this month, however, the situation had started to change, and on 5 June the Central Front had 1,216 tanks, or 72% of the number available to it on 5 July, including 171 tanks, or 80 of its 5 July total, in the 13^th Army.

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Just as rapid was the reinforcement of Vatutin’s Voronezh Front. On 5 April, it had 208,391 men and on 5 May 351,459 men, an increase of 143,068 men, and 84% of its planned strength on 5 July. During this period, the forces sent to General Leytenant Ivan M. Chistyakov’s 6^th Guards Army, on the probable axis of the Germans' main attack on the south-eastern shoulder of the Kursk salient, totalled 30,262 men to increase the army’s strength to 72,836 men: the average strength of the army’s infantry divisions rose by 28% from 5,982 to 7,666 men. In General Leytenant Mikhail S. Shumilov’s 7^th Guards Army, which lay farther to the south-east and on the probable axis of a German subsidiary attack, received 9,407 men to increase its total to 67,231 men, representing a 27% boost in divisional strengths from 5,965 to 7,600 men. By 30 May, the Voronezh Front’s men had increased in number to 409,785, or 98% of those available on 5 July. By 5 June the 6^th Guards Army and 7^th Guards Army had 79,937 men (about 100%) and 71,332 men (93% ) respectively.

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The Soviet mobile formations and units if the Voronezh Front and South-West Front operating in the winter and early spring of 1943 had suffered very heavy losses. In the various corps, tank numbers were no greater than those of full-strength battalions. As a result, at the end of March, the Soviet supreme command decided to replenish these formations at a matter of the highest priority. During April, the bulk of new vehicles delivered from Soviet factories was delivered for the reconstitution of these formations: between 1 and 15 April, the Voronezh Front received 219 new armoured vehicles and 6,432 men for its tank corps and brigades: while on 9 April the Voronezh Front had 276 serviceable tanks, on 21 April it had 540 such machines. At the same time, the repair of damaged combat vehicles was under way at an emergency pace by the front’s own repair facilities. In addition, on 28 April, the Stavka transferred to Vatutin General Leytenant Mikhail Ye. Katukov’s 1^st Tank Army, which had arrived in the Kursk region from the North-West Front in March, as well as several separate tank units. By 5 May, Katukov’s army was almost completely equipped with armoured vehicles, including 481 tanks, and by 5 July it would receive another 61 such vehicles.

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Thus, both the German and Soviet strategic formations were almost completely ready for the Battle of Kursk. At the same time, for example, the 9^th Army early in May did not receive the minimum that was promised before the start of 'Zitadelle',and at that time its infantry divisions and tank formations had not been fully restored and could not provide the answers required for the German summer campaign. By May, on the other hand, the Soviets were in the position to defeat the German assaults on the salient north-east and south-east shoulders. Thus von Manstein’s assertion that by the end of May the Soviet forces holding the salient were not fully combat-ready are far from the reality of the situation.

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There is a military axiom that the success of a strategic offensive operation the attackers must possess a 3/2 superiority over the defenders.

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As on 4 May, von Kluge’s Heeresgruppe 'Mitte', of which the 9^th Army was the key element, had a mere 442 PzKpfw III medium and PzKpfw IV battle tanks, but no examples of the new PzKpfw VI Tiger heavy tank. Of these 442 tanks, only 314 (71%) were serviceable. von Manstein’s Heeresgruppe 'Süd' had 1,087 tanks, of which 728 (67%) were serviceable. In May, therefore, the Soviet/German ratio in the north of the Kursk salient was 1.5/1, and in the salient’s south 1.3/1. This unfavourable ratio remained for the Germans right through to the start of 'Zitadelle'. Generalleutnant Hans Freiherr von Funck, who commanded the 7^th Panzerdivision in 'Zitadelle', criticised the German offensive plan as 'idiotic' and argued that the whole 'future operation violates the basic rules of troop command': it is hard to disagree with him.

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It has been argued that Model made a fundamental mistake, resulting from faulty intelligence when calculating the ratio of forces of armoured strength between his own and Rokossovsky’s forces, when early in May he reported to Adolf Hitler that contrary to German intelligence estimates, only about 1,000 tanks and assault guns were deployed on the Central Front late in April or early in May, rather than 1,500. This was a fundamental mistake that largely explains why Model insisted on postponing the offensive. With 800 tanks against 1,500, the army commander had the right to argue that additional armoured strength was badly needed for the offensive. If Model realised that the Soviet superiority in armour was about 200 vehicles, he would have had a greater desire to act at that time. During the period of the delay in May and June, the 9^th Army increased the number of its tanks by 25%, while the Soviets almost doubled their number of such vehicles.

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However, this argument has been countered by assessment of the relevant figures, which indicate that at the beginning of May Model did not have 800 tanks: there were only about half of this total on the whole of Heeresgruppe 'Mitte', and Rokossovsky’s front outnumbered Heeresgruppe 'Mitte' in tanks by 674 to 442. To break through the Soviet defence, therefore, at the beginning of April Model differed from von Manstein in opting to rely on infantry reinforced by artillery, self-propelled guns and engineers.

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This approach remained unchanged until the beginning of 'Zitadelle', and thus as the front of the Central Front was strengthened, Hoth, commander of the 4^th Panzerarmee, became increasingly concerned: 'Will the first-echelon troops be able to break through the main and second lines of the Soviet defence so that the armour can penetrate into the operational space?'

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Given his task of achieving a deep breakthrough, in May Model had at his disposal only a minimum allotment of armoured vehicles. And in order to achieve a decisive breakthrough of the Central Front’s defences, Model considered it necessary to field only heavy tanks which, being heavily armoured and possessing a powerful main gun, would in the first stage open the way for the infantry, destroy the best sited and most strongly constructed Soviet firing positions, and defeat any counterattacking Soviet tanks. On 3 May, however, Model had not a single such tank at his disposal, although in April the Oberkommando des Heeres had assured him that PzKpfw VI Tiger heavy tanks would be delivered before the end of the month.

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Model therefore demanded not only an increase in the number of armoured vehicles in his army, but insisted that his army received Tiger heavy ranks, PzKpfw V Panther battle tanks and Panzerjäger Tiger (P) (Elefant and later Ferdinand) heavy tank destroyers. Also of paramount importance for the 9^th Army was the need for its infantry divisions to be brought up to full strength from their current depleted state. This latter was so difficult that on 20 April the Oberkommando des Heeres ordered a postponement of the start date for 'Zitadelle'.

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Thus no credence can be given to the notion that Model was ready to commit his army in an assault toward Kursk as early as May. Model was in fact an opponent of 'Zitadelle': he was one of the few senior German commanders who not only understood its futility and was also unafraid to speak openly about it with Hitler.

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In the German eastward-facing Orel salient to the north of the westward-facing Soviet Kursk salient, von Kluge’s Heeresgruppe Mitte' had General Heinrich Clössner’s 2^nd Panzerarmee, whose three corps were located in the northern sector and did not become involved in 'Zitadelle', and Model’s 9^th Army in the southern sector. As the heart of the Germans planned offensive to reach Kursk from the north-west, this latter had five major subordinate formations: General Rudolph von Roman’s XX Corps with four infantry divisions, General Hans Zorn’s XLVI Panzerkorps with four infantry (sic) divisions, General Josef Harpe’s XLI Panzerkorps with one Panzer and two infantry divisions, General Joachim Lemelsen’s XLVII Panzerkorps with three Panzer and one infantry divisions, and General Johannes Friessner’s XXIII Corps with three infantry divisions. In reserve the 9^th Army had two Panzer and one Panzergrenadier divisions. In all, the Germans fielded about 460,000 men, 1,200 tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers, and about 6,000 pieces of artillery and mortars.

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Air support for the 9^th Army was provided by Generaloberst Robert Ritter von Greim’s Luftflotte Vi which, at the end of June in aid of 'Zitadelle', had some 730 aircraft allocated to the squadrons of the Jagdgeschwader 51 and JG 54 fighter wings, the Schlachtgeschwader 1 fighter-bomber wing, the Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 close support wing, and the Kampfgeschwader 1, KG 4, KG 51 and KG 53 bomber wings. In addition there were one or two short-range reconnaissance squadrons and one liaison squadron.

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Rokossovsky’s Central Front comprised General Leytenant Prokofi L Romanenko’s 48^th Army, Pukhov’s 13^th Army, General Leytenant Ivan V. Galanin’s 70^th Army, General Leytenant Pavel I. Batov’s 65^th Army, General Leytenant Ivan D. Chernyakovsky’s 65^th Army and General Leytenant Sergei I. Rudenko’s 16^th Air Army. Facing the attack sector of the 9^th Army was Pukhov’s 13^th Army, and the front’s reserve comprised General Leytenant Aleksei G. Rodin’s 2^nd Tank Army, the IX Tank Corps, the XIX tank Corps, and other reinforcement elements. Rokossovsky’s forces totalled 711,575 men, 1,785 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,284 pieces of artillery, 5,792 mortars and 1,034 aircraft. Excluding four reconnaissance aircraft, these last were the equipment of six fighter divisions (455 fighters), two assault divisions (241 assault aircraft) and four bomber divisions (260 day bombers and 74 night bombers).

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A very important role was played for the Soviets on the northern face of Kursk salient by Polkovnik Mikhail F. Ioffe’s 16^th Mechanised Engineering Brigade which, in collaboration with the Central Front’s organic engineering units, before the start of 'Zitadelle' developed and constructed a large and comprehensive system of field fortifications and obstacles, and during the battle created specialised mobile obstacle detachments for deployment to threatened sectors. Between April and June, as many as 3,100 miles (5000 km) of trenches and communication trenches were dug in the Central Front’s area of operations, and 237,000 anti-tank mines, 167,000 anti-personnel mines, 63 radio-controlled land mines, and 500 miles (805 km) of barbed wire were installed. In just the sector of the 13^th Army, engineers laid 50,000 anti-tank mines, 30,000 anti-personnel mines, about 1,000 land mines and 46 delayed-action mines.

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Despite his basic disbelief on the whole concept of 'Zitadelle', Model was bound by his orders and the strictures of Hitler and planned his part of the German offensive as best he could. The 9^th Army's strike force was to deliver the main attack from the north to the south in the general direction to Kursk, a target some 45 miles (75 km) distant. Model planned that the main part of the 9^th Army's operation would proceed in two echelons: in the first were two Panzer and seven infantry divisions, and in the second four Panzer, one Panzergrenadier and one infantry divisions. The protection of the strike group’s flanks and limited offensive/defensive actions on these flanks were to be the tasks of six infantry divisions in the sector between Troyena and Sevsk, and two infantry divisions in the sector between Zmievka and Malo-Arkhangyel’sk.

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The greatest density of the Soviet defence was on the Central Front’s right flank: 17 infantry divisions of the 70^th Army’s left flank, the 65^th Army, the 60^th Army and four infantry brigades were to continue their defence of the 125 miles (200 km) of the front’s defences round the rest of the northern and western faces as far round as the Seim river, where the Central Front met the Voronezh Front.

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Vasilevsky, the chief of the Soviet general staff, was all too aware of the danger inherent in any lengthy operational pause: 'As a result of…observation of the [Germans] on both the Voronezh and Central Fronts, as well as according to…intelligence, we already knew for sure that the [Germans] were fully prepared for the offensive. But for some reason the offensive did not start. This…bothered us a lot, and even unbalanced some. Vatutin began to show particular impatience…[and]repeatedly put before me the question of the need to start an offensive…My arguments that the [Germans'] transition to the offensive against us was a matter of the coming days and that our offensive would certainly be beneficial only to the [Germans], but he was not convinced…Alexander Mikhailovich! We will oversleep, we will miss the moment… The [Germans] are not coming, soon autumn and all our plans will fail. Let’s quit digging in and start first. We have enough strength for this. From daily negotiations with the supreme commander-in-chief, I saw that he was also restless. Once [Stalin] told me that Vatutin called him and insisted that our offensive should be launched no later than the first days of July…Stalin also said that he considered this proposal deserving of the most serious attention.'

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Finding no support from the general staff, Vatutin decided to find it in the person of Rokossovsky, who much to Vatutin’s surprise demurred categorically with the words '…After all, you yourself suggested launching an offensive without waiting for the Germans to start it in order to thwart their plans!.

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'I considered it possible and necessary before the deployment of [German] troops and bringing them into readiness for the offensive. The moment has passed. Now we just have to wait for the Germans to advance and meet them as expected.

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'Are you sure that the Germans will start it in the near future?

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'Absolutely sure! In less than a week, the Germans will strike in two directions at once – on Olkhovatka and on Oboyan. It will be hot for me and for you.

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'Why are you so sure of this?

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'The commander must be a psychologist! We must be able to think about and for the [Germans].

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'But we must do something!

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'A good effect will be given by pre-emptive artillery preparation against reconnoitred targets just before the start of the [Germans'] offensive. I am preparing such a surprise for him.

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'I’m ready to join. But the risk is great.'

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'It will justify itself.'

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The combination of reasonable risk, based on a large quantity of intelligence, and the transfer of his main strength into the area of the Germans' intended strikes gave Rokossovsky confidence in the success of the defensive part of the operation, and this was soon confirmed by events.

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In the 13^th Army, four options were outlined, with the German infantry and tanks accounting for only 17% of the pre-planned targets to be hit, the rest and essentially the main targets were artillery and observation posts. It has rightly been claimed that 'the choice of the moment to open fire in counter-preparation is perhaps the most difficult decision that the commander must make. Only with careful reconnaissance can the natural uncertainty in this case be avoided.'

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The battle on the axis between Orel and Kursk unfolded on a 25-mile (40-km) front and achieved an advance of 7.5 miles (12 km) in the course of a 13-day battle.

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Model disposed two of the 9^th Army's weakest mobile elements in the first echelon: these were Generalleutnant Mortimer von Kessel’s 20^th Panzerdivision with 50 tanks and one regiment of Generalleutnant Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben’s 18^th Panzerdivision with 69 tanks. This meant that the majority of the 9^th Army's armoured strength was farther to the rear in separate parts of the high-quality reinforcement which Model had planned on the basis of units of the XLI Panzerkorps such as the 656^th Panzerjägerregiment with vehicles such as the Panzerjäger Tiger (P) heavy tank destroyer and the 177^th Sturmgeschützabteilung and 244^th Sturmgeschützabteilung with assault guns. This amounted to a total of 233 tanks and self-propelled guns.

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To support the offensive of Lemelsen’s XLVII Panzerkorps, Model deployed both companies of the 505^th schwere Panzerabteilung with Tiger heavy tanks and the 245^th Sturmgeschützabteilung and 904^th Sturmgeschützabteilung with assault guns, in total 93 armoured fighting vehicles; to the support of Zorn’s XLVI Panzerkorps he allocated 40 tanks and assault guns' and to the the support of Friessner’s XXIII Corps he allocated 62 assault guns. In total, the 9^th Army committed 542 armoured fighting vehicles (57.7% of all such vehicles) into the battle as part of the Germans' first echelon on 5 July. On the axis of the main attack, in the zone of the XLVII Panzerkorps, the density of tanks was 18 vehicles per kilometre, and in the zone of the XLI Panzerkorps in was 25 vehicles per kilometre after the 18^th Panzerregiment entered the battle.

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Fighting on the southern face of the salient began during the evening of 4 July as German infantry launched attacks to seize high ground for artillery observation posts before the start of the main assault, and in the course of these attacks a number of Soviet command and observation posts along the first main belt of defence were captured. By 16.00, elements of Generalleutnant Walter Hörnlein’s Panzergrenadierdivision 'Grossdeutschland', Generalleutnant Franz Westhoven’s 3^rd Panzerdivision and Generalleutnant Johann Mickl’s 11^th Panzerdivision had seized the village of Butovo and advanced to capture Gertsovka before 24.00. At about 22.30, Vatutin ordered 600 of his front’s guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers to bombard the forward German positions, particularly those of the II SS Panzerkorps.

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To the north, at the headquarters of the Central Front, reports of the long-anticipated German offensive’s start started to arrive. At about 02.00 on 5 July, Zhukov ordered the start of the pre-emptive artillery bombardment in the hope of disrupting the concentration of the German forces earmarked for the attack, but this was not notably successful. The bombardment did serve to delay the German formations, but failed in its goal of disrupting their schedule or inflicting substantial losses. The Germans began their own artillery bombardment at about 05.00, and this lasted 80 and 50 minutes on the northern and southern faces respectively. After the barrage, the ground forces attacked with the support of Luftwaffe attack aircraft and fighter-bombers.

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Early in the morning of 5 July, the Soviet air forces launched a major raid against German airfields, hoping to destroy the Luftwaffe on the ground. This effort failed, however, and the Soviet air units suffered considerable losses. On 5 July, the Soviet air forces 176 aircraft and the German air forces only 26 aircraft. The losses of the 16^th Air Army operating over the salient’s northern face were lighter than those of the 2^nd Air Army over the southern face. The Luftwaffe was able to gain and retain air superiority over the southern face until 10/1 July, when the Soviet air forces began to assert themselves more capably and obtain the aerial ascendency, but the control of the skies over the northern face was evenly contested until the Soviet air forces began on 7 July to gain air superiority, which they kept for the rest of the operation.

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Model’s main attack was delivered by the XLVII Panzerkorps, which for this undertaking was supported by 45 Tiger heavy tanks of the attached 505^th schwere Panzerabteilung. Covering the left flank of the primary assault was the XLI Panzerkorps, with an attached regiment of 83 Ferdinand tank destroyers. On the right flank, the XLVI Panzerkorps comprised at this time of four infantry divisions with just nine tanks and 31 assault guns. To the left of the XLI Panzerkorps was the XXIII Corps, which comprised Generalleutnant Hans Traut’s reinforced 78^th Sturmdivision and two normal infantry divisions. While the corps contained no tanks, it did have 62 assault guns. Opposing the 9^th Army was the Central Front, deployed in three heavily fortified defensive belts.

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Model chose to make his initial attacks using infantry divisions reinforced with assault guns and heavy tanks, and supported by artillery and the Luftwaffe. In doing so he sought to maintain the strength of his Panzer divisions for the exploitation phase of the offensive after the Soviet defences had been breached. Once a breakthrough had been achieved, which Model thought would happen on the second day, the Panzer formations were to move through and advance toward Kursk. If a breakthrough did occur, the briefest delay in bringing up the Panzer divisions would give the Soviets sufficient time to react. It is worth noting, however, that the 9^th Army's corps commanders believed that a breakthrough was most unlikely.

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Following a German preliminary bombardment and a Soviet counter-bombardment, the 9^th Army began its attack at 05.30 on 5 July. Nine infantry divisions and one Panzer division, with attached assault guns, heavy tanks and tank destroyers, pushed forward. Two companies of Tiger tanks were attached to Generalleutnant Horst Grossmann’s 6^th Division, and represented the largest single grouping of Tiger tanks employed that day. Opposing them were the Central Front’s 13^th Army and 70^th Army.

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Generalleutnant Mortimer von Kessel’s 20^th Panzerdivision and Grossmann’s 6^th Division spearheaded the advance of the XLVII Panzerkorps. Behind them followed the corps' other two Panzer divisions, ready to exploit any breakthrough. The heavily mined terrain and fortified positions of the 15^th Division slowed the German advance, and by 08.00 safe lanes had been cleared through the minefield. That morning information which had been obtained from prisoner interrogation identified a weakness at the boundary between the 15^th Division and the 81^st Division as a result of the German preliminary bombardment. The Tiger tanks were therefore redeployed and struck toward this area. Soviet formations countered with a force of some 90 T-34 medium tanks, and in the three-hour battle that followed the Soviets lost 42 tanks while the Germans lost a mere two Tiger tanks and another five were immobilised by track damage. While the Soviet counterattack was defeated and the first defensive belt breached, the fighting had nonetheless delayed the Germans long enough for the rest of the 13^th Army’s XXIX Corps, initially deployed behind the first belt, to move forward and seal the breach. The Soviet minefields were covered by artillery fire, making efforts to clear paths through them both difficult and costly for the Germans. Goliath and Borgward IV remotely controlled engineer mine-clearing vehicles met with only limited success. Of the 653^rd schwere Panzerjägerabteilung's 45 Ferdinand vehicles committed, no fewer than 33 were immobilised by mine damage before 17.00. Most of these machines were later repaired and returned to service, but the recovery of these very large and clumsy vehicles was a difficult task.

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On the first day, the XLVII Panzerkorps achieved a penetration of 6 miles (9.7 km) into the Soviet defences before stalling, and the XLI Panzerkorps reached the small but very heavily fortified town of Ponyri, in the second defensive belt: Ponyri was of singular importance as it controlled the roads and the railway leading south to Kursk. In the first day, the Germans penetrated 5 to 6 miles (8 to 9.7 km) into the Soviet lines for the loss of 1,287 men killed and missing, and another 5,921 men wounded.

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Rokossovsky ordered the XVII Guards Corps and XVIII Guards Corps, together with the 2^nd Tank Army and XIX Tank Corps, backed by strong close air support, to counterattack the 9^th Army on the following day. As a result of poor co-ordination, only the XVI Tank Corps of the 2^nd Tank Army began the counterattack at dawn on 6 July after the preparatory artillery barrage. This corps, fielding about 200 tanks, attacked the XLVII Panzerkorps and ran into the Tiger tanks of the 505^th schwere Panzerabteilung, which destroyed or immobilised 69 of the Soviet tanks and forced the rest to withdraw toward the XVII Guards Corps of the 13^th Army. Later in the same morning, the XLVII Panzerkorps responded with its own attack against the XVII Guards Corps entrenched around the village of Olkhovatka in the second defensive belt. The attack began with an artillery barrage and was spearheaded by the 505^th schwere Panzerabteilung's 24 serviceable Tiger tanks, but failed to break the Soviet defence at Olkhovatka, where the Germans suffered heavy casualties. Olkhovatka was on high ground that provided a clear view of much of the front line. At 18.30, the XIX Tank Corps joined the XVII Guards Corps, and this marked a significant increase in the strength of the area’s Soviet defence. Rokossovsky also decided that most of his remaining tanks should now be dug in to minimise their exposure. Defended by the 307^th Division of the XXIX Corps, Ponyri came under further heavy attack on 6 July by Generalleutnant Wolfgang von Kluge’s 292^nd Division, Generalleutnant Helmuth Weidling’s 86^th Division, the 78^th Sturmdivision and Generalleutnant Walter Scheller’s 9^th Panzerdivision, but the Germans were unable to dislodge the defenders from this terrain-favoured and heavily fortified village.

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Over the next three days, between 7 and 10 July, Model concentrated the 9^th Army's efforts on Ponyri and Olkhovatka, which each side saw as vital. In response, Rokossovsky pulled forces from other parts of the front to these sectors. The Germans attacked Ponyri on 7 July, and captured half of the village after intense house-to-house fighting. A Soviet counterattack in the morning of the following day compelled the Germans to withdraw, and there then developed a series of counterattacks by each side: control of the village passed back and forth several times over the next few days. By 10 July, the Germans had secured most of Ponyri, but Soviet counterattacks continued. The see-saw fighting for Ponyri and the nearby Hill 253.5 was attritional, with heavy casualties on each side, and became known to the troops as a 'small Stalingrad'. The 9^th Army's war diary described the heavy fighting as a 'new type of mobile attrition battle'. German attacks on Olkhovatka and the nearby village of Teploye failed to penetrate the Soviet defences, and there was a powerful concerted attack on 10 July by about 300 tanks and assault guns of Generalleutnant Hans-Karl von Esebeck’s 2^nd Panzerdivision, Generalleutnant Dietrich von Saucken 's 4^th Panzerdivision and von Kessel’s 20^th Panzerdivision supported by all of the Luftwaffe’s air power available on the northern face of the salient.

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On 9 July, von Kluge, Model, Lemelsen and Harpe met at the headquarters of the XLVII Panzerkorps as it had become clear to the German commanders that the 9^th Army lacked the strength to obtain a breakthrough. It was also clear that the Central Front’s leaders had also come to the same conclusion, but von Kluge desired to maintain the pressure on the Soviets in order to aid the southern offensive.

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While the operation on the northern side of the salient began with an attack frontage of 28 miles (45 km), by 6 July this had been reduced to 25 miles (40 km). On the following day the attack frontage was reduced still further to 9.3 miles (15 km), and on both 8 and 9 July the Germans achieved penetrations of only 1.25 miles (2 km). By 10 July, the Soviets had completely halted the German advance.

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Between 5 and 11 July, the Central Front lost, in total, 33,897 men (15,336 killed or missing, and 18,561 wounded or taken ill). By 19 July, the Soviets had taken 7,165 men prisoner, 822 defectors, 1,060 tanks, 136 guns, 265 anti-tank guns, 20 anti-aircraft guns, 198 mortars, 690 machine guns, 19 aircraft, 626 machine guns, 339 anti-tank guns, 2,470 rifles, 19 Nebelwerfer rocket launchers and one flamethrower.

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Thus, it took only one week for the Central Front to slow and then to halt the Germans, on whom its troops inflicted severe losses. As the Central Front reported it: 'Having met the [Germans] with a wall of smashing metal, Russian staunchness and tenacity, the troops of the Central Front exhausted the [Germans] in continuous fierce eight-day battles and stopped his onslaught. The first stage of the battle is over.' Thus the scene was set for the Soviet counter-offensive on the northern face of the Kursk salient:this was the 'Orel Strategic Offensive Operation', otherwise 'Kutuzov', which began on 12 July and whose two sub-operations were the 'Volkhov-Orel Offensive Operation' (12 July/18 August) and the 'Kromy-Orel Offensive Operation' (15 July/18 August).

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The hostilities of the 'Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation' triggered by 'Zitadelle' on the southern face of the Kursk salient became known as the 'Belgorod-Kursk Defensive Operation'. This began on the same day as the 'Orel-Kursk Defensive Operation' but lasted longer to end on 16 July, one day before the Voronezh Front and Steppe Front began their own counter-offensive.

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On 12 July the Soviets launched 'Kutuzov', otherwise known as the 'Orel Strategic Offensive Operation', as their counter-offensive upon the Germans' eastward-facing salient centred on Orel, and this quickly threatened the flank and rear of the 9^th Army. Generalleutnant Erpo Freiherr von Bodenhausen’s 12^th Panzerdivision, hitherto held in reserve and slated to be committed to the northern side of the Kursk salient, together with Generalleutnant Hans Gollnick’s 36^th Division (mot.), Generalleutnant Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben’s 18^th Panzerdivision and von Kessel’s 20^th Panzerdivision were redeployed to face the new Soviet threat.

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On the other face of the Kursk salient, at about 04.00 on 5 July, the German attack began with a preliminary bombardment. von Manstein’s main attack was delivered by Hoth’s 4^th Panzerarmee, which was organised into densely concentrated spearheads. Opposing the 4^th Panzerarmee was Chistyakov’s 6^th Guards Army, which comprised the XXII Guards Corps and XXIII Guards Corps. These Soviet forces occupied three heavily fortified defensive belts to slow and weaken the attacking armoured forces. Although it had been provided with superb intelligence about the Germans' strength and overall intention, the Voronezh Front’s headquarters had not yet been able to pinpoint the exact location where the Germans would commit their offensive weight.

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Hörnlein’s Panzergrenadierdivision 'Grossdeutschland' was the strongest single division in the 4^th Panzerarmee, and was supported on its flanks by Generalleutnant Franz Westhoven’s 3^rd Panzerdivision and Generalleutnant Johann Mickl’s 11^th Panzerdivision. The PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV tanks of the Panzergrenadierdivision 'Grossdeutschland' had been supplemented by a company of 15 Tiger heavy tanks, which were to spearhead the attack. At dawn on 5 July, the Panzergrenadierdivision 'Grossdeutschland', backed by heavy artillery support, advanced on a 1.85-mile (3-km) front against the 67^th Guards Division of the XXII Guards Corps. Advancing on the left wing of its parent division, the Füsilierregiment 'Grossdeutschland' entered a minefield and became stalled, and subsequently 36 Panther battle tanks were immobilised. The stranded regiment was subjected to a barrage of Soviet anti-tank and artillery fire, which inflicted numerous casualties. Engineers moved forward and cleared paths through the minefield, but suffered casualties in the process. The combination of fierce resistance, minefields, thick mud and mechanical breakdowns took its toll. With paths cleared, the regiment resumed its advance toward Gertsovka. In the fighting which followed, the numerous German casualties included the regimental commander. As a result of the fighting, and the marshy terrain to the south of the village on the Berezovy stream, the regiment once more became bogged down.

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Advancing on the right wing, the Grenadierregiment 'Grossdeutschland' pushed through to the village of Butovo. The tanks were deployed in an arrow formation to minimise the effects of the Soviet so-called Pakfront defence, with the Tiger heavy tanks leading and the PzKpfw III, PzKpfw IV and assault guns fanning out to the flanks and rear. The armour was followed by the infantry and combat engineers. The Soviets made strenuous efforts to slow if not to halt the German advance, but their efforts were stymied by German close support aircraft.

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Westhoven’s 3^rd Panzerdivision, advancing on the left flank of the Panzergrenadierdivision 'Grossdeutschland', made good progress and by the end of the day had captured Gertsovka and reached Mikhailovka. Generalleutnant Wolf Trierenberg’s 167^th Division, on the 11^th Panzerdivision's right flank, also made good progress, reaching Tirechnoye by the end of the day. On 5 July, therefore, the Germans had driven a wedge into the first belt of the Soviet defences.

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To the east, during the night of 4/5 July, Waffen-SS combat engineers had infiltrated no-man’s land and cleared lanes through the Soviet minefields. At dawn on 5 July, the three formations of Hausser’s II SS Panzerkorps (SS-Oberstgruppenführer Joseph Dietrich’s 1^st SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler', SS-Obergruppenführer Walter Krüger’s 2^nd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Das Reich' and SS-Gruppenführer Max Simon’s 3^rd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Totenkopf') attacked the 6^th Guards Army’s 52^nd Guards Division. The main assault was led by a spearhead of 42 Tiger heavy tanks, but in total 494 tanks and assault guns attacked across a 7.5-mile (12-km) front. The 3^rd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Totenkopf', the strongest of the three divisions, advanced toward Gremuchy and screened the right flank. The 1^st SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler' advanced on the left flank toward Bykovka. The 2^nd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Das Reich' advanced between the two formations in the centre. Following closely behind the tanks were the infantry and combat engineers, coming forward to demolish obstacles and clear trenches. In addition, the advance was well supported by the Luftwaffe, which greatly aided in destroying Soviet strongpoints and artillery positions.

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By 09.00, the II SS Panzerkorps had broken through the Soviet first defensive belt along its whole front. While probing positions between the first and second Soviet defensive belts, at 13.00 the leading elements of the 2^nd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Das Reich' came under fire from two T-34 tanks, which were destroyed, but soon after this another 40 Soviet attacked the division. The 1^st Guards Tank Army clashed with the 2^nd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Das Reich' in a four-hour battle, as a result of which the Soviet army pulled back. However, the battle had bought the Soviets enough time for units of the XXIII Guards Corps,positioned in the Soviet second defensive belt, to ready itself and receive a reinforcement of more additional anti-tank guns. By a time early in the evening, the 2^nd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Das Reich' had reached the minefields marking the forward edge of the Soviet second defensive belt. The 1^st SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler' had secured Bykovka by 16.10 and then drove forward toward the second defensive belt at Yakovlevo, but its attempts to break through were rebuffed. By the end of the day, the 1^st SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler' had suffered the loss of 97 men dead, 522 wounded, and 17 missing, and had lost about 30 tanks. Together with the 2^nd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Das Reich', it had forced a wedge deep into the defences of the 6^th Guards Army.

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The 3^rd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Totenkopf' was making slow progress, and had isolated the 155^th Guards Regiment of the 52^nd Guards Division of the XXIII Guards Corps from the rest of its parent division, but its attempts to sweep the regiment eastward into the flank of the neighbouring 375^th Division of the same corps had failed when the regiment was reinforced by the 96^th Tank Brigade. Hausser requested aid from General Hermann Breith’s III Panzerkorps to his right, but the latter could spare nothing. By the end of the day, the 3^rd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Totenkopf' had made very limited progress , in part as a result of the fact that a tributary of the Donets river lay in its path. The division’s lack of progress undermined the advance made by its sister divisions and exposed the corps' right flank to Soviet counterattack. The temperature, reaching more than 30° C (86° F), and frequent thunderstorms made fighting conditions difficult.

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Facing attack by the XLVIII Panzerkorps and II SS Panzerkorps, the 6^th Guards Army was reinforced with tanks from the 1^st Tank Army, the II Guards Tank Corps and the V Guards Tank Corps. The 51^st Guards Division and the 90^th Guards Division were moved up to the vicinity of Pokrovka (some 25 miles [40 km] to the south-west of Prokhorovka, location of a huge tank battle in the near future, and with which it is often confused) and into the path of the 1^st SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler'. The 93^rd Guards Division was deployed farther to the rear, along the road linking Pokrovka and Prokhorovka.

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Facing Armeeabteilung 'Kampf', which comprised Breith’s III Panzerkorps and General Erhard Raus’s Generalkommando zbV 'Raus', were Shumilov’s 7^th Guards Army, whose formations and units had entrenched themselves on the high ground on the eastern bank of the Severny Donets river. The two German corps were tasked with crossing the river, breaking through the 7^th Guards Army and covering the right flank of the 4^th Panzerarmee. The 503^rd schwere Panzerabteilung, operating 45 Tiger heavy tanks, was also attached to the III Panzerkorps, with one company of 15 Tiger tanks attached to each of the corps' three Panzer divisions.

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At the Mikhailovka bridgehead, just to the south-east of Belgorod, eight infantry battalions of Generalleutnant Walther von Hünersdorff’s 6^th Panzerdivision crossed the river under heavy Soviet artillery fire. Part of a company of Tiger tanks was able to cross before the bridge was destroyed, but the rest of the 6^th Panzerdivision was unable to cross farther to the south as a result of traffic congestion at the crossing, and remained on the western bank of the river throughout the day. The division’s units which did succeed in crossing the river attacked Stary Gorod, but were unable to break through in the face of poorly cleared minefields and strong resistance.

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To the south of the 6^th Panzerdivision, Generalleutnant Gustav Schmidt’s 19^th Panzerdivision crossed the river but was then delayed by mines, moving forward 5 miles (8 km) by the end of the day. Luftwaffe bombed the bridgehead in a 'friendly fire' incident, wounding von Hünersdorff and Oberst Hermann von Oppeln-Bronikowski, commander of the 11^th Panzerregiment. Farther still to the south, tanks and infantry of Generalleutnant Hans Freiherr von Funck’s 7^th Panzerdivision crossed the river. A new bridge had to be built specifically for the Tiger tanks, and this caused further delays. Despite a poor start, the 7^th Panzerdivision eventually broke into the first belt of the Soviet defence and pushed forward between Razumnoye and Krutoi Log, advancing 6.2 miles (10 km), which was the deepest penetration achieved on this day by Armeeabteilung 'Kampf'.

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Operating to the south of the 7^th Panzerdivision, were Generalleutnant Werner Forst’s 106^th Division and Generalleutnant Kurt Röpke’s 320^th Division of the Generalkommando zbV 'Raus'. The two formations attacked across a 20-mile (32-km) front without armoured support. The advance began well as the two divisions crossed the river and advanced swiftly against the 72^nd Guards Division. The Generalkommando zbV 'Raus' took the village of Maslovo Pristani, penetrating the first Soviet defence line. A Soviet counterattack, supported by about 40 tanks, was beaten off with the support of the guns of artillery and Flak batteries. After having losing some 2,000 men killed and wounded since the morning and still facing considerable Soviet resistance, the Generalkommando zbV 'Raus' dug in for the night.

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Delaying the progress of the [a]Armeeabteilung 'Kempf' allowed gave the Soviet forces the time to complete the preparation of their second belt of defence to meet the German attack on 6 July. The 7^th Guards Army, which had absorbed the attack of the III Panzerkorps and the Generalkommando zbV 'Raus', was reinforced by two rifle divisions from the reserve. The 15^th Guards Division was moved into the second belt of defence, in the path of the III Panzerkorps.

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By the evening of 6 July, the Voronezh Front had committed all of its reserves other than three infantry divisions under the 69^th Army, but was unable to effect a decisive containment of the 4^th Panzerarmee. Moving along the axis toward Oboyan, on which the third defensive belt was mostly unoccupied, the XLVIII Panzerkorps now had only the Soviet second defensive belt blocking it from breakthrough into the unfortified Soviet rear. This forced the Stavka to commit its strategic reserves to reinforce the Voronezh Front: this reinforcement took the form of the 5^th Guards Army and 5^th Guards Tank Army, both from the Steppe Front, as well as the II Tank Corps from General Rodion Ya. Malinovsky’s South-West Front, which was holding the front to the south of the Voronezh Front. Konev objected to this premature and, he considered, piecemeal commitment of the strategic reserve, but a personal call from Stalin silenced his complaints. In addition, on 7 July Zhukov ordered General Leytenant Vladimir A. Sudets’s 17^th Air Army, part of the South-West Front’s forces, to support General Leytenant Stepan Ya. Krasovsky’s 2^nd Air Army in supporting the Voronezh Front. On 7 July, General Leytenant Pavel A. Rotmistrov’s 5^th Guards Tank Army began advancing toward Prokhorovka.

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The X Tank Corps, then still subordinate to the 5^th Guards Army, was rushed ahead of the rest of the army to reach Prokhorovka on the night of 7 July, and the II Tank Corps arrived at Korocha, some 25 miles (40 km) to the south-east of Prokhorovka, by the morning of 8 July. Vatutin ordered a powerful counterattack by the V Guards Tank Corps, II Guards Tank Corps, II Tank Corps and X Tank Corps, in all fielding about 593 tanks and self-propelled guns, and supported by most of the front’s available air power, against the II SS Panzerkorps, who defeat would expose the right flank of the XLVIII Panzerkorps. At the same time, the VI Tank Corps was to attack the XLVIII Panzerkorps and prevent it from breaking through into the Soviet rear. Although intended as a nicely co-ordinated effort, the counterattack turned out to be a series of piecemeal attacks as a result of poor co-ordination. The X Tank Corps' attack began on the dawn of 8 July but ran straight into the anti-tank fire of the 2^nd SS Panzerdivision 'Das Reich' and 3^rd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Totenkopf', the Soviet corps losing most of its strength. Later in the morning of the same day, the V Guards Tank Corps' attack was repelled by the 3^rd SS Panzergrenadierdivision 'Totenkopf'. The II Tank Corps joined the Soviet counterattack during the afternoon and was also repelled. The II Guards Tank Corps, masked by the forest around the village Gostishchevo some 10 miles (16 km) to the north of Belgorod and therefore undetected by the II SS Panzerkorps, advanced toward Generalleutnant Wolf Trierenberg’s 167^th Division. The Soviet corps was then detected by German air reconnaissance just before the attack had materialised, and was subsequently decimated by German ground-attack aircraft armed with heavy cannon and lost at least 50 of its tanks: this was the first time that an attacking tank formation had been defeated by air power alone. Although a failure, the Soviet counterattack did succeed in stalling the advance of the II SS Panzerkorps throughout the day.

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By the end of 8 July, the II SS Panzerkorps had advanced about 18 miles (29 kn) since the start of 'Zitadelle' and broken through the first and second Soviet defensive belts. However, slow progress by the XLVIII Panzerkorps caused Hoth to shift elements of the II SS Panzerkorps to the west to help the XLVIII Panzerkorps regain its momentum before, on 10 July, the full weight of the corps was shifted back to its own advance. The direction of the advance now shifted from north in the direction of Oboyan to the north-east in the direction of Prokhorovka. Hoth had discussed this move with von Manstein since a time early in May, and it had been part of the 4^th Panzerarmee's plan since the start of the offensive. By this time, however, the Soviets had shifted reserve formations onto its the army’s new axis. The defensive positions were manned by the II Tank Corps, reinforced by the 9^th Guards Airborne Division and the 301^st Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, both elements of the XXXIII Guards Corps.

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Though the German advance in the south was slower than has been planned, it was nonetheless faster than the Soviets had expected. On 9 July, the first German units reached the Psel river, which the first German infantry crossed on the following day. Despite the depth of the Soviet defensive system and its associated minefields, German tank losses remained lower than those of the Soviets. This was the point at which Hoth turned the II SS Panzerkorps away from Oboyan toward Prokhorovka. The primary concern of von Manstein and Hausser was the inability of Armeeabteilung 'Kampf' to advance and thereby shield the eastern flank of the II SS Panzerkorps. On 11 July, Armeeabteilung 'Kempf' finally achieved a breakthrough. In a surprise night attack, the 6^th Panzerdivision seized a bridge across the Donets river and, once over this waterway, Breith’s corps made every effort to push troops and vehicles across the river for an advance on Prokhorovka from the south as the establishment of a physical link with the II SS Panzerkorps would result with the encirclement of the 69^th Army.

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